Why do …rms decide to o¤shore certain parts of their production process? What quali…es certain countries as particularly attractive locations to o¤shore? In this paper we address these questions with a theory of international production hierarchies in which organizations arise endogenously to make e¢ cient use of agents' knowledge. Our theory highlights the role of host-country management skills (middle management) in bringing about the emergence of international o¤shoring. By shielding top management in the source country from routine problems faced by host country workers, the presence of middle managers improves the e¢ ciency of the transmission of knowledge across countries. The model further delivers the prediction that the positive e¤ect of middle skills on o¤shoring is weaker, the more advanced are communication technologies in the host country. We provide evidence consistent with this prediction.
I. INTRODUCTION
of control model to analyze FDI ‡ows across countries. Their analysis distinguishes between …rm speci…c and host country embedded productivity and shows how the lack of high productivity …rms in the host country, combined with high country-wide embedded productivity, fosters o¤shoring. In contrast with this paper, our analysis incorporates endogenous organizational structures with potentially more than two layers. We therefore underscore the role of middle managers in increasing …rm productivity and the role of local communication costs in determining a country's embedded productivity.
The remainder of the paper contains six sections. In Section II, we describe the general setup.
In Section III, we analyze the emergence of o¤shoring in a model where a host country (the South) has very limited opportunities of production and we illustrate the positive role of middle managers in bringing about o¤shoring. In Section IV, we look at the other polar case in which the North and the South share access to the same communication technologies, while in Section V we consider intermediate cases. Section VI summarizes one of the key empirical implication of the theory and contrasts it with the data. The last section concludes.
II. GENERAL SET UP
The model builds on Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) -AGR hereafter-, which in turn builds on Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a) . The framework here is simpler in that we assume a discrete number of skill levels (rather than a continuum).
The model is however more general than AGR in that (i) we allow for the formation of teams with more than two layers (which is a prerequisite for studying the role of middle management); and (ii) we introduce di¤erences between the costs of transmitting knowledge locally and internationally.
The world economy is inhabited by a unit measure of agents, each endowed with a skill The world consists of two countries: the North and the South. As in AGR, we assume that the North and the South are endowed with di¤erent distributions of skills, with the North being endowed with relatively higher skill levels. We capture this feature in a stark way: all agents in the North are endowed with a skill level equal to z h , while agents in the South are endowed with a skill level equal to z m or z l . 6 Our assumptions on the distribution of skills lead to a stylized model of the decision of high skilled northern agents on whether to o¤shore to the South or remain self-employed.
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Agents derive linear utility from consuming the only good in the economy, whose price is normalized to one. Production of this good combines labor and knowledge. As in Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006a) , production requires solving the problems that arise in production. An agent with skill z can solve all problems indexed between 0 and z, so an agent with skill z 0 > z can solve all the problems that z can solve plus some extra ones. That is, knowledge is cumulative. We normalize the set of problems so that the skill level z is also the proportion of problems an agent can solve. Agents have one unit of time that they can use in production or communicating with other agents.
Agents face a unit measure of problems per unit of production time and we normalize output so that a unit measure of solved problems yields one unit of output.
Agents can choose to produce together in teams or work on their own (self-employment).
A self-employed agent with knowledge z spends all his time in production and solves a fraction z of the problems that he confronts. Hence, his expected output and income is given by y = z. Agents producing in teams can communicate their knowledge to others, and thus help them solve problems. This possibility allows them to form organizations in which several individuals combine their time and knowledge to produce together. Such organizations are composed of production workers, who draw problems, and problem solvers (managers), who can answer questions and thus help workers solve the problems they cannot solve on their own. Agents are income maximizers and so choose the occupation that pays them the highest wage given their ability.
Workers draw problems and try to solve them. If they can, they produce; if they cannot, they ask for help to the managers right above them, in which case these managers incur a communication cost h i 2 (0; 1), where i denotes the identity and location of the parties communicating (which we will specify below). If the manager knows the solution 6 This implies that the relative size of the North is given by s h = (s m + s l ). 7 It would be straightforward to extend the analysis and allow domestic team formation in the North. This would however substantially increase the taxonomy of cases to consider without providing many insights into the role of southern skills in fostering o¤shoring.
to the problem the team produces output. If the manager does not know the solution but has a manager above him, he asks this manager for help, and this upper-level manager incurs a communication cost h j (more on this below). In such a case, production occurs only if the upper-level manager knows the solution to the problem. The skill distribution we assume above, with only three levels of skill, implies that three organizational forms can potentially arise in equilibrium, namely, three-layer teams, two-layer teams, and selfemployed agents.
8 Hence, the above discussion su¢ ces to cover the workings of all possible production teams.
To summarize, production is organized in knowledge hierarchies, with some agents specialized in production and some in management. This production structure also gives rise to 'management by exception,'whereby production workers deal with the most common problems and problem solvers with the exceptions. These characteristics are optimal under the assumption that agents do not know who may know the solution to problems they cannot solve, as Garicano (2000) showed in a model with homogeneous workers. The purpose of the hierarchy is to protect the knowledge of those who are more knowledgeable from easy questions others can solve. Hence, multinationals will provide two di¤erent inputs to agents in the South: …rst, the ability to bene…t from the knowledge of high-skilled agents in the North; and second, access to a (weakly) better technology for local communication. We interpret the latter feature as a form of technology transfer from multinationals to the South. 9 Throughout the paper we assume that there is no international market for the better local communication 8 More speci…cally, it is never optimal to assign two agents with the same skill level to di¤erent layers of an organization (or to have subordinates with higher talent than managers). The reason is that then managers would not increase the output of subordinates but the cost of production would increase by their wage (see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a) . 9 This feature is also consistent with widely available data suggesting that foreign a¢ liates of multinational …rms appear to be more productive than comparable domestic …rms in the same host country (see for instance, Aitken and Harrison, 1999) . technology of multinationals. On top of local telecomunications, this technology can be though of as processes and a common culture that are designed to facilitate information ‡ows within the team. Such processes are not codi…ed or systematized and, therefore, cannot be sold or transferred in the market across borders and …rm boundaries (e.g. Arrow, 1974) .
10 As we will see below the relative quality of the local multinational and southern technologies will be crucial in the analysis.
Let us illustrate how production in a two-layer team is carried out. Suppose a top manager with knowledge z 2 leads a team of n 0 production workers. These workers draw a unit measure of problems each, and solve a fraction z 0 of them. Hence they pass on a fraction (1 z 0 ) of all problems. Managers are thus asked to solve n 0 (1 z 0 ) problems, which they can address in n 0 (1 z 0 ) h i units of time. Optimally, managers join teams with precisely the right number of production workers so that they use all their time.
Since all agents have one unit of time available, the team size n 0 is implicitly given by
where i 2 fI; L; Sg : The time constraint implies that the span of the manager is limited by the knowledge of their subordinates.
Output is produced whenever either workers or manager know the solution to the problems, so
Note the source of complementarity between skills in our model: An able top manager increases the productivity of all workers in the team. At the same time, the more knowledgeable are subordinates, the larger the team and the more can managers leverage their knowledge.
Denote the earnings of workers by w 0 . Then zero pro…ts implies that the wage of managers is given by
Production in three-layer teams is similar but it includes a measure n 1 of middle managers. Let their skill level be given by z 1 . Then if the skill of workers is given by z 0 , the top manager is only asked to solve n 0 (1 z 1 ) problems, while the layer of middle managers are asked to solve n 0 (1 z 0 ) problems. The time constraints of these two-layers of managers are thus
and
where h j for j 2 fI; L; Sg denotes the cost of communicating knowledge from top to middle managers. These two equations pin down the size of each of the two lower layers in the team.
Denoting the earnings of middle managers by w 1 , we have that
In the next three sections, we turn to analyze the equilibrium of our two-country world economy, where all agents maximize utility and labor markets clear in both countries. We denote by w i the earnings of an agent with skill z i . Note that if the equilibrium is such that a fraction of agents with skill level z i remain self-employed, then the equilibrium wage of all agents with that skill level necessarily equals w i = z i .
As mentioned above, the simple skill distribution we have assumed implies that we can focus on studying three-layer teams, two-layer teams, and self-employment. This is because it is never optimal to assign two agents with the same skill level to di¤erent layers of an organization. Similarly, a team will never have a manager that is less skilled than his subordinates. In terms of the speci…cs of our two-country model, this implies that northern agents with skill z h will either be self-employed or top managers, while southern agents with skill z l will either be self-employed or workers. Southern agents with skill z m may be top managers of two-layer teams, middle managers, workers or self-employed.
We shall assume throughout that s h is su¢ ciently low relative to s m and s l , which ensures that high-skilled northern agents are self-employed only in situations in which all other agents in the world economy are also self-employed.
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III. EQUILIBRIUM WITH INEFFICIENT SOUTHERN COMMUNICATION
We start by analyzing a situation in which the local communication costs h S faced by southern agents in domestic teams are so high that domestic southern teams never form.
Namely, h S is such that
In words, total production in a local southern team is smaller than what its members can get if they work as self-employed. This leads to a world economy that will be in one of four possible equilibria: 12
No O¤shoring
This corresponds to a situation in which agents in the North do not …nd pro…table to form two or three-layer teams with agents in the South. In such a case, all agents are necessarily self-employed (since middle-and low-skilled agents do not form teams in the South). This implies that all agents earn their self-employment wages:
In this case, northern agents decide to form international teams, but only with southern middle-skilled agents (who become workers). Northern agents thus earn a wage equal to
where w m refers to the wage of southern middle-skilled agents. It is clear that agents with skill z l will in this case be self-employed and thus w l = z l . Furthermore, notice that equation (1) with h i = h I pins down the relative share of agents of each type in a two-layer team as a function of parameters. It will thus be the case that, for su¢ ciently low s h (our assumption above), a fraction of medium-skilled agents will also remain unemployed in equilibrium, and thus w m = z m .
This case is similar to the one above, but now northern agents form teams with lowskilled southern agents. The wages of the northern agents are in this case given by
12 We ignore the possibility of "mixed equilibria," with some of the four situations below coexisting. The discussion below should make clear that, for a su¢ ciently low fraction s h of high-skilled agents (our maintained assumption), these mixed equilibria can only happen in knife-edge cases.
13 What do we mean by a "su¢ ciently low s h "? For this particular case, the condition for mediumskilled agents to be in excess supply at a wage higher than z m is given by s h < s m h I (1 z m ). Analogous conditions can be derived for the other cases.
In addition, it is clearly the case that w m = z m (all medium-skilled southern agents are self-employed), and for su¢ ciently low s h , a fraction of the low-skilled southern agents will also be self-employed, implying that w l = z l .
Three-Layer O¤shoring
In this case, agents in the North form three-layer teams and obtain a wage given by
Notice from equations (2) and (3) that the relative shares of agents of each type in these teams are …xed, in the sense that they are pinned down by parameters. It will thus (generically) be the case that a fraction of agents of at least two types will end up being self-employed in equilibrium, and the wages of these two types will then be determined by their self-employment wages. For low enough s h , it will necessarily be the case that all agents in the South will earn their self-employment wages: w m = z m and w l = z l .
III. A. Communication Costs, Middle Skills and O¤shoring
Having described these four potential types of equilibria, let us study when they emerge in equilibrium. First note that high-skilled agents in the North always prefer to form twolayer teams with low-skilled agents than two-layer teams with medium-skilled agents.
That is,
for all z m > z l . This implies that given our assumptions on the supply of skills, equilibria of type 2 never arise. 14 Next note that an equilibrium with three-layer o¤shoring requires
Straightforward di¤erentiation implies that the left-hand side of this inequality is increasing in middle skills z m if and only if
In that case, when z m is close to z l , (5) will not hold, while when z m is su¢ ciently large, (5) will necessarily hold. Hence, there exist a unique threshold skill level b z m 2 (z l ; 1) over which three-layer o¤shoring is an equilibrium and under which it is not. The threshold b z m is obtained by setting (5) to equality.
In the converse case in which h L > b h L , one can easily verify that condition (5) cannot possibly hold for any z m 2 (z l ; 1) ; and thus three-layer o¤shoring cannot be an equilibrium. 15 In such case, the equilibrium will entail no o¤shoring or two-layer o¤shoring. In particular, no o¤shoring is preferred to two-layer o¤shoring if international communication
while two-layer o¤shoring is preferred to no o¤shoring when the converse of condition (7) holds.
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Formally stated, if we de…ne o¤shoring as the volume of production in multinational teams, we have shown that:
Because the choice between no o¤shoring and two-layer o¤shoring is independent of z m , we can thus conclude that a larger z m tends to (weakly) favor the emergence of an equilibrium with o¤shoring. 17 In addition, the output of o¤shoring teams is (weakly) increasing in the skill level of middle managers. Therefore, we can conclude that:
Corollary 1 If h S b h S , in equilibrium o¤shoring is (weakly) increasing in the skill level z m of middle-skilled agents.
In words, we need that middle-skilled agents in the South are relatively able and that the cost of communicating knowledge across borders is large relative to the cost of communicating knowledge within borders. 17 Since b h S depends on z m , increases in z m may move the equilibrium away from the set in which the proposition applies, namely, h S b h S . However, we will show below (Proposition 2) that when h S < b h S the equilibrium has the same properties.
Our analysis therefore highlights the role of middle-skilled agents in fostering o¤shoring.
Intuitively, higher ability middle-skilled agents are better able to protect top managers in the North from "expensive"routine problems, thus making o¤shoring more attractive.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM WITH EFFICIENT SOUTHERN COMMUNICATION
In the previous section we have shown that the existence of "middle skills"in the South fosters international o¤shoring. This section brie ‡y illustrates that this result heavily relies on our assumption that domestic team formation is limited by high local southern communication costs.
To see this, consider the case in which h S = h L and so local communication costs are the same no matter if local communication happens within multinational teams or within southern domestic teams. Relative to the previous section, the only new feature is that an equilibrium may now include two-layer teams between agents with skills z m and z l .
The ability to form local teams imposes the following restriction on southern wages,
If this condition was not satis…ed in equilibrium, southern agents would have incentives to deviate from that equilibrium and form two-layer teams among themselves. Using condition (8), one can show that the rents that northern agents with skill z h obtain from three-layer o¤shoring must satisfy
With the possibility of the formation of two-layer southern teams, there is an additional instrument to clear factor markets, and (generically) the equilibrium will now feature only one type of agents being (partially) self-employed. Condition (9) above implies that whenever some agents with skills z m or z l are self-employed (which will be the case whenever s h is low, as we have been assuming throughout), then three-layer o¤shoring will be dominated by two-layer international o¤shoring.
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The intuition behind this result is that when agents in the South have the option of forming teams between themselves, the opportunity cost of forming three-layer international teams increases to the point where these become unpro…table.
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How do medium skills a¤ect the extensive margin of o¤shoring in this case? It is straightforward to see that whenever low-skilled southern agents are partially self-employed, then w l = z l : And since w m z m , two-layer o¤shoring will only emerge if it involves lowskilled workers. The analysis of this case is as in the previous section, with o¤shoring emerging only if z h h I < b h L , which is independent of z m . If, alternatively, middle-skilled southern agents are partially self-employed then it is no longer clear which type of twolayer o¤shoring will emerge in equilibrium. This depends on a relative comparison of
Regardless, of the form of two-layer o¤shoring, it is clear however that a larger z m will reduce the attractiveness of o¤shoring versus no o¤shoring.
This section has therefore shown that the emergence of o¤shoring, and in particular that 
When h S is high enough (h S b h S ), two-layer southern teams will not be formed in equilibrium and the analysis is as in Section III. For lower h S (h S < b h S ), these teams will be formed and will ensure that only one type of agent is self-employed in equilibrium. Let us focus on these situations hereafter.
We next consider the four cases discussed in Section III, but now taking into account that the wages of southern agents will satisfy (10) with equality. To simplify the exposition, we will focus on the case in which s l is high enough to ensure that low-skilled southern agents are partially self-employed, and thus w l = z l and
to acquire knowledge increase with the size of their teams, making three (or more) layer teams pro…table even though agents in lower layers can organize by themselves.
We brie ‡y consider an alternative scenario at the end of this section.
As in Section III, we begin by noting that since w m > z m whenever h S < b h S , twolayer o¤shoring with middle-skilled southern agents will again be dominated by two-layer o¤shoring with low-skilled southern agents. Furthermore, since w l = z l , the comparison between this latter option and no o¤shoring is identical to that discussed in Section III and no o¤shoring will dominate two-layer o¤shoring whenever
Next note that an equilibrium with three-layer o¤shoring requires
This condition is analogous to (6) in Section III, but it also applies to cases in which h S is not prohibitively high (i.e., h S < 1). Moreover, it is again the case that provided that (12) holds, when z m is close to z l , (11) will not hold, while when z m is su¢ ciently large, (11) will necessarily hold. Hence, there again exists a unique threshold skill level z m 2 (z l ; 1) -obtained by setting (11) to equality -over which three-layer o¤shoring is an equilibrium and under which it is not.
Following the same logic as in Section III, one can show that in the converse case in which h L =h S > b h L , condition (11) cannot possibly hold for any z m 2 (z l ; 1) ; and thus three-layer o¤shoring cannot be an equilibrium. In such case, the equilibrium will entail no o¤shoring or two-layer o¤shoring, with the choice determined by the relative size of
Formally stated we have shown that:
Proposition 2 If h S < b h S ; there exists two thresholds b h L 2 (0; 1) and z m 2 (z l ; 1) such that:
(i) Three-layer o¤shoring is an equilibrium if and only if h L =h S < b h L and z m > z m .
(ii) Otherwise, o¤shoring is independent of z m . If z h h I > b h L there is no o¤shoring in equilibrium, while if z h h I < b h L two-layer o¤shoring is an equilibrium.
Relative to Proposition 1, the main new result is the e¤ect of the domestic communication cost h S . Consistently with the results in Section IV, if h S is su¢ ciently low, then three-layer o¤shoring may cease to emerge in equilibrium, and the condition that determines the emergence of o¤shoring is independent of z m . In particular, notice that
, which explains why we did not observe three-layer teams emerging in equilibrium in that case.
In addition, straightforward di¤erentiation also indicates that the positive e¤ect of z m on the left-hand-side of equation (11) 
V. A. Overall E¤ect of Middle Skills
So far, we have divided the analysis in two regions: h S b h S (Section III) and h S < b h S (Sections IV and V). Because the threshold b h S depends itself on z m , one may worry that by increasing z m we may jump from one region to another discontinuously. This is not the case. In particular, when we substitute the expression for b h S in the left-hand side 20 This follows from
of (11) (the pro…ts from three layer o¤shoring when h S < b h S ) , we obtain exactly the left-hand side of condition (5) (the pro…ts from three layer o¤shoring when h S b h S ). In other words, the pro…ts from three-layer o¤shoring are continuous in z m when we cross b h S . Since the right-hand side of these conditions is identical in both cases, the positive e¤ect of z m on three-layer o¤shoring (or simply o¤shoring) holds globally. For the most part of the paper we have assumed that s l is high relative to s m and s h , which ensures that some low-skilled agents are self-employed in equilibrium. The case in which some middle-skilled agents are self-employed in equilibrium delivers very similar results. In particular, the model continues to predict that the partial e¤ect of z m on o¤shoring is (weakly) increasing in h S . 21 The main di¤erence is that, consistently with the results at the end of Section IV, the e¤ect of z m on o¤shoring may now be negative for su¢ ciently low h S . 21 In this case w l = [1 h S (1 z l )] z m and w m = z m . This can be used to show that in the case of three layer o¤shoring or two layer o¤shoring with low types @ 2 w h =@z m @h S > 0, while in the case of two layer o¤shoring with medium types @ 2 w h =@z m @h S = 0:
VI. EVIDENCE
The simple model above was useful to understand the characteristics of target countries that lead to international o¤shoring. In this section we underscore the main empirical implication of the model and present evidence that suggests that it is supported by the data. In our theory, when southern communication costs are high, o¤shoring increases with the ability of medium-skilled agents (Corollary 3). The intuition is that, in some cases, in order for high-skilled agents in the North to bene…t from o¤shoring, they need to add a layer of local managers that allows them to economize on international communication costs. In order for middle-skilled agents to serve this role, they need to be su¢ ciently skilled and their opportunity cost must be su¢ ciently low. Hence, the main implication of the model is that in countries where local communication technology is relatively bad (so middle managers can only lead small and ine¢ cient southern teams), o¤shoring increases with the ability of middle-skilled managers. In contrast, in countries where communication technology is good, these middle managers will organize local teams and so more talented middle-skilled agents may not result in more o¤shoring, but only in more productive local teams.
The main empirical prediction of the theory can then be expressed as: 22 We divide by GDP since the absolute level of o¤shoring in the model can be arbitrarily determined by choice of productivity and population size. We are aware that FDI is an imperfect measure of the volume of o¤shoring (see Lipsey, 2003) . Unfortunately, data on the operations of o¤shoring facilities is of agents in the relevant age range enrolled in secondary school (SSE). Finally, our measure of southern communication costs is an index of the availability of communication technologies constructed using data on telephone, computer and internet usage. The Appendix includes a description of the factor analysis that leads to this index as well as more details on the raw series. Using the index we divide countries into two sets. Throughout the analysis we use averages of these variables for the decade 1993-2002.
We use the set of 122 countries for which we have complete data for all the variables of interest.
The raw data is presented in Figure 3 . The …gure also presents the corresponding regression lines, using a quantile regression with medians. All results presented in this section use quantile regressions to diminish the in ‡uence of outliers. The Appendix includes a discussion of quantile regressions and all results using OLS. In the graph, and in all OLS results in the Appendix, we eliminate two countries from the sample: Luxembourg and Equatorial Guinea. Both of these countries have extraordinarily high FDI over GDP ratios. This is probably the result of their small size and the predominance of particular industries, characteristics that our model is not designed to address. All quantile regressions do include these two observations. Figure 3 shows that at …rst glance the prediction of the theory does well. The regression line for countries with bad communication has a larger slope than for countries with good communication. In countries with good communication technology the slope is in fact negative, which is consistent with the prediction of the theory described at the end of Sections IV and V.
not available for a large-cross section of host countries. 23 The cuto¤ used to build the dummy variable BCI is 0.5, which corresponds to one-half standard deviation above the mean communication index. All our results are robust to increasing or decreasing this cuto¤ by one-quarter standard deviation. Consistent with the model, if we lower the threshold even more (say to the mean communication index, that is, 0) the results become insigni…cant although they have the predicted sign. The reason is that we are mixing countries for which the e¤ect of middle skills should be positive with countries for which the e¤ect should be negative (such as Kuwait), which leads to insigni…cant coe¢ cients. The coe¢ cients of both regression lines are presented in the …rst two columns of Table   1 (standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote signi…cant coe¢ cients at 1%, 5% and 10% levels). One may think that the result is due to the fact that the countries with good .0646 which is signi…cant at a 5% level. Hence, for the rest of the empirical study we use the whole sample of countries. We next seek to estimate more e¢ ciently the interaction e¤ect between the BCI dummy and secondary school enrollment by running a speci…cation that incorporates the whole set of countries and includes an interaction term, together with the BCI dummy and the level of SSE in the regression. The third column of Table 1 presents these results. The prediction of our theory is that the interaction term should be positive and signi…cant, and this is what we …nd in Table 1 . This result does not depend on the particular construction of our index, as the coe¢ cient on the interaction term is positive and signi…cant at the 5% level using each of the components of the index separately.
A potential problem with these results is that secondary school enrollment may be highly correlated with other factors that, one may reasonable argue, in ‡uence the level of FDI/GDP, although they are not part of our theory. One of these factors is GDP per capita. In particular, our data on FDI in ‡ows includes horizontal FDI, that is, FDI aimed at producing and selling products in these countries. Because GDP per capita is a proxy for market potential, it could have an independent e¤ect on the ratio FDI/GDP.
The fourth column of Table 1 presents the results if we add GDP per capita to our empirical speci…cation. It is clear that this hardly changes our results. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term remains positive and signi…cant. The coe¢ cient of GDP per capita is not signi…cant at the 10% level. Another concern is that our BCI index might be capturing some general level of development in these countries. To address this, we have also incorporated GDP as a dummy variable (that is, we divide the sample into high and low income countries) as well as an interaction of SSE and GDP (both directly and as a dummy variable). Our results are robust to these empirical exercises and in all cases the variables related to GDP are not signi…cant as long as we incorporate the BCI index as well.
Our theory makes a clear distinction between agents with di¤erent skill levels. These agents perform di¤erent roles in the economy and have di¤erent occupations in equilibrium. It is important, therefore, that these results are not just driven by some average level of education, but by secondary or intermediate levels of education. In particular, the prediction of our theory for the e¤ect of the skill level of medium-skilled agents on FDI/GDP does not hold for low-skilled agents. Thus, to study whether the results presented re ‡ect the forces in our theory, we repeat the regression presented in the fourth column of Table 1 but using instead primary school enrollment (PSE). The results are presented in the …fth column of Table 1 . We …nd reassuring that the interaction term involving primary school enrollment and communication technology appears statistically insigni…cant. To emphasize this conclusion we also run the regression using both levels of schooling. In column 6, the interaction term of secondary schooling remains positive and signi…cant, while the one for primary schooling is insigni…cant. Overall, we interpret our results as strongly suggestive of the existence of a disproportionately positive e¤ect of middle skills on o¤shoring in countries with bad communication technology.
In linking the main prediction of the theory with this empirical exercise in Table 1 we have equated secondary school enrollment to intermediate skills. In our setup, however, these intermediate skills are the highest skill levels in developing countries. Therefore, a reasonable concern is that the actual empirical counterpart of our intermediate skills is
probably some measure of tertiary education -which leaves post-graduate education as the counterpart of high skills in the North-or a combination of tertiary and secondary education. Of course, secondary education is a requirement for tertiary education and so the union of tertiary education and secondary educations is equivalent to using SSE. We repeated the exercise in Table 1 and obtain the same qualitative results using tertiary education. Given that many managers in less developed countries are agents without college we prefer to call intermediate skills the union of secondary and tertiary school enrollment and so, to save on space, we do not present the results using only tertiary education.
A potential concern with the results above is that our index of local communication costs is constructed using data on telephone, computer, and internet usage, which may lead to endogeneity of our communication cost index. FDI can determine how much agents use these technologies, which would lead to biased coe¢ cients. Following this logic, a natural conjecture is that FDI decreases the index of bad communication technology, and it does so more the higher secondary school enrollment. However, this mechanism would tend to bias the interaction term towards zero. Hence, this type of endogeneity would tend to reinforce our …nding that the true coe¢ cient is positive and signi…cant. Of course, endogeneity may take other forms and so this argument does not de…nitely solve the endogeneity problem. We would need better data on the state of communication technology, not the use of technology, in order to rule out other potential sources of endogeneity. Table 2 in the Appendix presents the same six regressions using OLS instead of quantile regressions. The results are qualitatively similar. We obtain all the right signs and all the relevant coe¢ cients are signi…cant, although only at the 10% level. Admittedly, this body of evidence, although consistent with the theory, is more suggestive than conclusive.
Bilateral data (and preferably at the industry level) seems necessary to develop a much more complete taxonomy of the characteristics that make some countries good targets of o¤shoring. 24 We leave this for future research.
A …nal caveat of our empirical analysis is that we have used FDI ‡ows as a proxy for o¤shoring in our theory. Of course, while in our theory o¤shoring is a measure of real activity, in the data FDI is a measure of …nancial activity. As such, FDI ‡ows could well be a¤ected by the characteristics of the …nancial system in the host country. For instance, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) and Antràs, Desai and Foley (2007) 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The theory we develop in this paper makes two main points. First, that the ability of multinationals to change their organizational form and make use of agents with different talents is important to understand the decision of organizations to o¤shore part of their production. In our theory this organizational change takes the form of an extra intermediate layer of management, and so the ability of these managers becomes a crucial determinant of the extensive margin of o¤shoring. Second, that the local communication technology of a country determines the opportunity costs of workers -since it determines the characteristics of local teams-and therefore the desirability of such a country as a target for o¤shoring. In order to understand this second argument, and the interaction between both of them, it is necessary to have a general equilibrium theory where these opportunity costs and the o¤shoring decisions are both determined in equilibrium.
These two main arguments lead to several empirical implications from which we have highlighted one that can be readily contrasted with the data. Namely, that the ability of middle-skilled agents increases o¤shoring by relatively more in countries where communication technology is bad, than in countries where communication technology is relatively good. The empirical results we present are encouraging in that they suggest that this is in fact the case in the data, and that this relationship is not driven by the level of development or the availability of agents with lower skills. The model has other predictions that we have not studied empirically: most importantly, that o¤shoring will happen in larger teams (and with more layers) in countries where middle-skilled agents are relatively able.
Since this large teams are also more e¢ cient (output per worker is higher) this also provides an implication for the productivity of the …rms that o¤shore to these countries. An empirical investigation of this prediction requires, of course, data on …rm characteristics and so we leave it for future work.
APPENDIX: DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS Communication Index
The raw data used to construct our index of the state of communication technology in each country is taken from the online version of the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). The index is constructed using data on telephone, computer and internet usage. The three series are, respectively, (i) …xed line and mobile phone subscribers per 1,000 inhabitants; (ii) personal computers per 1,000 inhabitants; and (iii) internet users per 1,000 inhabitants. To build the communication index we …rst average the three indicators for the 1993-2002 period, and then we perform a factor analysis of the correlation matrix. We used the …rst factor as the basis for the country-by-country communication index, which has mean 0 and standard deviation equal to 1.
A 0:5 cuto¤ in this index yields a division of countries into 93 countries with "bad" communication technologies (BCI = 1) and 29 countries with "good" communication technologies (BCI = 0). We list the countries in each group below.
Countries with low communication costs (BCI = 0): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
Countries with high communications costs (BCI = 1): Albania, Algeria, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Etiopia, Fiji, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovakia, South Africa, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis in Table 1 , (Section VI) presents a quantile (median) regression, or least absolute value model; the model chooses by maximum likelihood the vector of regressors b to minimize P i jy xbj (rather than, as in OLS, P i (y xb) 2 ): Such an estimator is preferred whenever there are substantial outliers in the dependent variable, which are given excessive weight in the calculation of the regression by OLS.
Our results remain however unchanged if we proceed by OLS and restrict our attention to a sample of countries with F DI=GDP < 40%. Such restriction excludes from the analysis 2 extreme outliers: Luxembourg, with an average FDI/GDP for the sample period of 459.5% and Equatorial Guinea with an average of 43.84%. These should be compared to a sample distribution with quantiles 1.44%, 2.93%, and 4.86%. For completeness, in Table 2 below we present OLS results in exactly the same order as in Table 1 in the body of the paper. 
